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For the first time in centuries, the Chinese nation is poised to restore its position as a 
major world power. Journalists and academics reiterate familiar statistics on the rise of China, 
including the concurrent rise in greenhouse gas emissions. The novel impacts of rapid 
industrialization and capitalist development in China are uneven over space and social class, but 
those processes guarantee considerable environmental damage. As such, new discourses of 
“sustainable development” congeal with official state narratives of progress, and the literature on 
efforts toward Chinese environmental sustainability expands in kind.  
In 1992 the American political scientist Francis Fukuyama published The End of History 
and the Last Man to widespread praise in the popular press. Fukuyama’s central thesis, 
developed with the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, was that liberal 
capitalism had “won” the ideological battle and would find acceptance, with merely minor 
revisions, throughout the entire world.1 It is certainly true that liberal capitalism, defined as a 
system of private ownership and both markets and strategic state intervention, holds hegemony 
over the world economic system. Although Fukuyama’s thesis later endured substantial 
criticism, I contend that we live in an historical period termed capitalist modernity.   
In Keywords Raymond Williams notes that “in relation to institutions or industry [the 
modern is] normally used to indicate something unquestionably favourable or desirable.”2 In this 
sense modernity refers to the political, economic, and cultural institutions of a given society at a 
given period of time, whereas modernization is considered the ‘progressive’ means toward 
modernity. Modernization as a process is deeply intertwined with the end goal of modernity. It is 
an undeniable matter of fact that we live in the first truly global society in the history of human 
                                                 
1 Fukuyama, Francis. The End of History and the Last Man. Free Press, 1992.  
2 Williams, Raymond. Keywords: A Vocabulary of Culture and Society. New York: Oxford  University Press, 1983. 
209.  
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beings, and that society is essentially state capitalist in nature.  Twenty years after the publication 
of The End of History the question remains: will our modernity ever become ancient history? 
 It is possible that the capitalist world system is approaching “the end of history.” 
Although Fukuyama did not intend to say as much, if carbon emissions continue to rise along the 
path of “business as usual,” there may be no historians or political scientists to separate modern 
from ancient. Since the 1990s China embraced certain aspects of market economies, including 
financial liberalization and foreign direct investment. In effect, the Chinese Communist Party 
accepted the hegemony of capitalist modernity, with real consequences for the Chinese people 
and the environment. Andrew Jones summarizes the multidirectional impact of capitalist 
development on the most populous country in the world:  
Developmentalism, in short, has underwritten the transformation of China from a 
socialist state to a capitalist market economy, resulted in the creation of enormous new 
prosperity and new forms of poverty, and validated the massive social and spatial 
dislocations that have accompanied them. The logic of development has also rationalized 
– even necessitated – the degradation of China’s natural environment.3  
 
Chinese New Left intellectuals such as Wang Hui pose a central question amid the 
unprecedented threat of environmental destruction and the historical resurgence of China. Will 
China’s rise reconstitute the notion of development and result in an alternative modernity? This 
“reconsideration of developmentalism” can be viewed as a possible rejection of the logic of 
Western-style economic development, with its concomitant impact on the environment.4  The 
“eco-city” of Dongtan and the “eco-village” of Huangbaiyu are two potential models and case 
studies in sustainable modernity.  
                                                 
3 Jones, Andrew F. Developmental Fairy Tales: Evolutionary Thinking and Modern Chinese  Culture. 
Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 2011. 
4 The End of the Revolution: China and the Limits of Modernity. Verso, 2011. 1-272. Print. 95. 
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Dongtan, located on Chongming Island near the largest metropolis in the world, 
Shanghai, demonstrates the crucial position of cities. Urban areas consume the majority of the 
world’s resources and, given widespread urbanization, incorporate over half of the world’s 
population. The city-region will figure prominently if human societies can construct a 
sustainable future, or at least a less unsustainable one, and avoid the “end of history.” 
Huangbaiyu, on the other hand, represents the antithesis to urbanization and counters city-
centered consumerism with attempts at rural development. Both Dongtan and Huangbaiyu, in 
their very conception, aim for a degree of self-sufficiency and material efficiency essential to any 
rubric of sustainability.  
After examining the history of China’s considerable environmental and social challenges, 
this paper examines the multidimensional spatial configuration at Dongtan and Huangbaiyu. 
While the case studies evince the nature of the tension between town and countryside in 
advanced capitalist societies, planners paid scant attention to the issue of local participation and 
control. In order to be truly sustainable, projects like Dongtan and Huangbaiyu must engage in 
direct democracy rather than technocratic management. Finally, I examine the theoretical and 
logistical failures of the projects.  
In sum, I focus on three enduring themes related to sustainable development in China: the 
deep divide between the city and the countryside, the historical legacy of Western imperialism, 
and the appropriate role of popular participation in technical decision-making. In the context of 
our case studies, all three themes provide lessons on the nature of a strong, democratic 
sustainability and the potential for an alternative modernity.  
Sources of Chinese Environmental Consciousness: 
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Philosophical, Historical, and ‘Modern’ 
 Before examining Dongtan and Huangbaiyu, it is necessary to examine briefly the human 
environmental history of China and the milieu of contemporary environmental considerations. 
The philosophical traditions informing historical attitudes toward the environment are too 
diverse to describe in full. However, Confucianism provides a particularly potent encapsulation 
of general trends. “Nature possessed a godlike ability to wreak havoc or bring bounty as 
punishment or reward for humans’ behavior…Earth had the critical role of providing for man’s 
benefit.”5 The imperial ideology of the Mandate of Heaven reinforced the link between nature 
and humans, if the two could ever be separated. Beginning with the Zhou Dynasty, this 
philosophical formulation postulated a legitimizing link between heaven (tian) and the ruler 
(tianzi, or Son of Heaven), with natural disaster and other weather events evincing a ruler’s 
position within the cosmos. This concept served as the underpinning for both entrenched rule and 
sudden shifts in kings or even dynasty.  
 The mythical stories still repeated by Chinese citizens also reflect an oppositional attitude 
toward non-human nature. As may be expected from mythical archetypes, heaven and earth are 
separated as a foundational act. Afterward, the purported founder of Chinese civilization, the 
semi-divine Emperor Yu, repeatedly contended with the rising waters of especially the Yangtze 
River. “The tales involving mythic conflicts are generally straightforward- gods battle against 
nature or one another, something in nature is damaged, chaos results, and then order is 
restored.”6 Often order itself was altered in the course of myth. In an ancient story adopted and 
                                                 
5 Economy, Elizabeth. The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future,  2nd ed. Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 2005. 1-363. 32.  
6 Chetham, Deirdre. Before the Deluge: The Vanishing World of the Yangtze’s Three Gorges. New  York City: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2002. 1-296. 35. 
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manipulated by Mao, Yu Gong employs supernatural aid to move mountains, thus proving 
human dominance and power.7  
While there are many examples of myths predicated on a conflict between humans and 
nature, elements of the Chinese philosophical tradition also avoids any inseparable duality 
between the two. “The Confucian worldview is anthropocosmic: humans exist in relational 
resonance with, and indeed must maintain a delicate balance with, the natural forces of the 
universe.”8 Indeed, the Mandate of Heaven and other Chinese mythological standards can be 
interpreted as privileging humans, but non-human nature deserves considerable respect and 
possesses power. Confucian and Daoist approaches to nature, in contrast with ancient myths, 
frequently advocate understanding of humans as existing within nature. Furthermore, these two 
traditions tend to stress concordance based on both human needs and the intrinsic, rather than 
purely instrumental, worth of non-human nature. This is not to say that every dynastic ruler 
envisioned non-human nature as an intrinsic good. Rather, we can trace the reflexive identity of 
people in China through their philosophical traditions and historical relations with the 
surrounding environment.  
Much of the historical literature identifies the inauguration of the modern period in China 
with the First Opium War of 1839-1842, in which the Qing Dynasty suffered ignominious defeat 
at the behest of British gunboats. As such, many Western academics implicitly suggest millennia 
of a singular Chinese civilization with limited variation: Confucian, Legalist, Daoist, or perhaps 
ethnic rule as part of a conquest dynasty. In part, this tendency results from the practice of famed 
                                                 
7 Economy, The River Runs Black: The Environmental Challenge to China’s Future, 42. 
8 Tilt, Bryan. The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China: Environmental Values and Civil  Society. New 
York City: Columbia University Press, 2010. 1-165. 86. 
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American historian of China John King Fairbank. Fairbank’s studies introduced the “contact 
hypothesis” into the study of China, documenting Euro-American stimulus and Chinese response 
since the first major British intervention.9 The orthodox method clearly fails to account for the 
diversity and dynastic change within Chinese civilization, and presents China as merely a passive 
object of domination by Western powers. However, for our purposes there is compelling 
justification for advancing through centuries of important history, namely an absence of relevant 
historical data.  The present study, by locating the modern with the arrival of foreign imperialists, 
aims to focus attention on the importation of another, concomitant force: industrialization. 
The interrelated ideologies of imperialism and Western-style industrialization combined 
to catalyze change within the Qing Dynasty, while also accelerating its downfall. With the 
Opium Wars, which finally ended in 1860, the Western imperialist powers overwhelmed the 
Qing with superior military technology and merciless force in order to impose the unequal treaty 
system, described in Part II. Taken in combination with the equally embarrassing result in the 
Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, the survival of the dynasty depended on a fundamental 
reconsideration of geopolitics. The so-called “self-strengthening movement” was primarily a 
movement among Chinese intellectuals, who questioned the appropriate course of action for the 
state given the threat of European and North American rivals. In basic terms, the self-
strengthening movement sought to selectively adapt Western development models, especially 
concepts like “science and technology” in order to improve the Chinese polity.  
The above context provides essential background to the adoption of capitalist ideology 
and industrialization in China, although I will not fully recapitulate the diverse streams of 
                                                 
9 Fairbank, John King, and Merle Goldman. China: A New History. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Belknap Press of 
Harvard University Press, 2006. 203-205. 
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thought comprising self-strengthening here. The stability of the dynasty now threatened, state 
bureaucrats and other intellectuals systematically studied the conceptions of political change 
within the Western philosophical context. Still, some “conservatives feared that mines, railroads, 
and telegraph lines would upset the harmony between man and nature (fengshui) and create all 
sorts of problems…an ongoing process of self-sustaining industrial growth was never 
achieved.”10 According to Fairbank, those who did sympathize with self-strengthening cleaved 
in two directions. Some emphasized the technological and military superiority of the Western 
powers, most evident in weapons and boats, and urged rapid development of competing 
technologies. In contrast, a radical minority insisted that the Qing must import Western ideology 
in addition to technology. The intellectual ferment of self-strengthening contained within it a 
tacit acknowledgment of the immense vulnerability of the Qing vis a vis the Western powers. 
While state intellectuals influenced dynastic policy for centuries, in the late 19th century the Qing 
reached a crisis point as intellectuals insisted on fundamental rather than piecemeal reform.  
The West is not a monolithic category, of course, and Chinese intellectuals certainly 
“responded” to the “stimulus” of changes in European political economy and philosophy. During 
the 19th century Western scientific culture itself experienced radical revision with the 
development of evolutionary theory by Charles Darwin, Alfred Russel Wallace, and other 
leading luminaries. As Andrew Jones rightly notes, “the world-historical dimension of the 
colonial diffusion of evolutionary theory in the later nineteenth and earlier twentieth centuries 
has been neglected.”11 Chinese intellectuals disseminated evolutionary thinking much like the 
rest of the colonized world, through emerging print technology in the treaty port cities that 
                                                 
10 Fairbank and Goldman, China: A New History, 219.  
11 Jones, Developmental Fairy Tales, 28. 
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hosted imperial settlements. That fact alone should suggest strong linkage between an emerging 
anti-colonial identity and reflexive awareness as human beings encompassed by nature or the 
environment. 
The work of the prodigious translator Yan Fu establishes this ideological connection 
more concretely. China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War in the waning years of the 19th century 
motivated Yan, who studied at the Naval Academy in Great Britain, to devote himself to the 
more radical wing of the self-strengthening movement. Yan produced the first translations into 
Mandarin of some of the foremost British intellectual figures, notably the liberal economists 
Adam Smith and John Stuart Mill, as well as T.H. Huxley and Herbert Spencer, who helped 
popularize Darwin’s evolutionary theory. The Chinese translator’s selection of Spencer is 
particularly interesting. More than any other figure, Spencer articulated what is now known as 
Social Darwinism, the selective application of evolutionary theory and natural selection to 
human affairs. Like Spencer, Yan explicitly adapted the former’s “survival of the fittest” to the 
political sphere. In this formulation, China’s subordination to imperial nations in the West was 
nothing more than a law of nature. Indeed, in On Evolution Yan develops Social Darwinist 
determinism even further, comparing colonization and even genocide to struggle in the world of 
plants and non-human animals.12 
Most importantly for our purposes, Yan’s interpretation of Social Darwinism informed 
his conception of possible futures. Spencer’s identification of the law of progress is revealing: 
“change from the small to the large, from the simple to the complex, from the elementary to the 
                                                 
12 Jones, Developmental Fairy Tales, 19.  
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advanced.”13 Yan and his contemporaries conceived of progress, like development, as inherently 
desirable and almost inexorable. In the Western context the process of industrialization leads to 
industrialism, just as the related process of modernization leads inevitably to capitalist 
modernity. The Enlightenment notion of progressive self-development eventually led the notion 
of “civilization,” which, according to Raymond Williams, initially referred to a process rather 
than a status.14 Lastly, British neoclassical economists constructed an image of an ideal 
economy, abstract and placed firmly in the future. Jones insists, on the other hand, that Chinese 
intellectuals like Yan conceptualized development as the need to manage the effects of a 
destructive modernity.  Even as Yan “naturalized” the crimes of colonialism, most Chinese 
intellectuals understood modernity as “China’s humiliating and unequal participation in the 
globalized historical time of the modern interstate system.”15 Early on, then, anti-imperial 
consciousness produced a conflicted desire for an alternative to global capitalist modernity. 
 The importation and adaptation of evolutionary thought was clearly linked to the 
development of a Chinese nationalism, as modeled in Benedict Anderson’s paradigmatic piece 
Imagined Communities.16 If Darwinism and Chinese nationalism formed a causal relationship, 
then both could be regarded rightly as endogenous to human-ecological interaction. The 
intellectual history of the early modern period depended on increasing interaction and 
interference with non-human nature. The endless search for natural resources animated the 
imperialist projects of the industrial powers, which then stimulated the strong modernist ethic of 
many Chinese nationalists. All of these ideological currents converge in the historical personage 
                                                 
13 Jones, Developmental Fairy Tales, 16. 
14 Williams, Keywords, 57-58. 
15 Jones, Developmental Fairy Tales, 19. 
16 Anderson, Benedict. Imagined Communities. London: Verso, 2006. 
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of Sun Yat-Sen, the founder of the Nationalist Party, Republican China, and, it is fair to say, the 
“father of modern China.”  
 The great Republican leader Sun Yat-sen, significantly, was the first to propose the 
construction of a hydroelectric dam along the Yangtze River in the early 1910s. Given the chaos 
of the republican period, which was overrun by civil strife and conflict between warlords, Sun’s 
proposal was more of a “romantic vision” than an incipient reality. However, this vision was 
connected with Sun’s desire for a long-term modernization program, including damming the 
Yellow River and exploiting fossil fuel reserves. In a speech in 1924, Sun said that “‘when that 
time comes, we shall have enough power to supply railways, motor cars, fertilizer factories, and 
all kinds of manufacturing establishments.’”17  Sun’s predicated his ideological support for 
modernization projects on “catching up” with the Western imperial powers and resisting China’s 
“semi-colonial” subjugation. 
As an ardent nationalist, Sun identified the state as progenitor and principal architect of 
modernization campaigns. The Three Gorges Dam was a convenient proposal, then, given the 
almost unimaginable technical apparatus required for such a project. Although authors argue as 
to when Sun first proposed Three Gorges, his most sophisticated argument for the dam came 
with the publication of The International Development of China in 1920. The book was 
dominated by potential water conservancy projects, some of them described in vivid technical 
detail. The idea of damming the Yangtze River clearly excited Sun, and he claimed the 
possibility of reaping 30 million horsepower in hydroelectric energy from the Three Gorges. Yet 
Sun, who advanced the populist political philosophy of the Three People’s Principles, also 
                                                 
17 Chetham, Before the Deluge: The Vanishing World of the Yangtze’s Three Gorges, 117. 
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insisted that the dam would benefit the public in addition to industry. “‘The benefit to the people 
will be enormous and the encouragement to commerce will indeed be great.’”18 In summation, 
Sun’s state-led modernization program clearly invoked the struggle between “man and nature” to 
promote a nascent nationalist movement and counter Western influence.  
 Because of the political chaos of the Republican period, Sun never successfully united the 
Chinese nation under one popular government. However, Mao Zedong and the Communist Party 
revered Sun as a foundational figure, in spite of subsequent conflict with Sun’s Nationalist Party. 
Harvard historian Judith Shapiro has demonstrated that with the “high socialist modernization” 
of the Maoist period (1949-1976), nature declined in status. Mao Zedong identified human 
struggle as the primary mobilizing force in society, and gave primacy to class struggle. Shapiro 
documented how the Maoist rhetoric of class struggle translated into environmental policy. 
Essentially, much in the same way people were mobilized to unseat the “counterrevolutionary” 
classes, mass mobilizations sought to overcome nature’s obstacles. Indeed, one very popular 
Mao-era slogan was “Man Must Conquer Nature.”19 Mao’s environmental thought directly 
contradicted traditional approaches that emphasized harmony between nature and human beings. 
Importantly, though, the struggle of humans against nature was conceptualized as a historically 
determined process that would inevitably result in human hegemony. “Indeed, the effort to 
unleash popular energy in a war against nature is one of the distinctive characteristics of 
Maoism.”20  
                                                 
18 Yin, Liangwu. The long quest for greatness: China's decision to launch the Three Gorges Project. St. Louis: 
Washington University, 1996. 1-635. Ph.D. Dissertation. 475.  
19 Shapiro, Judith. Mao’s War Against Nature: Politics and Environment in Revolutionary China.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2001. 1-287. 67.  
20 Shapiro, Mao’s War Against Nature: Politics and Environment in Revolutionary China, 49. 
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 Perhaps the most blatant examples of this attitude were the industrial projects pursued as 
part of the Great Leap Forward, a period from 1958 to 1961 of tragically misguided 
industrialization and famine that caused an estimated 20-30 million excess deaths. Mao framed 
the Great Leap Forward, in part, as a movement to “catch up” with the British in terms of steel 
production. The Great Leap Forward’s campaign mentality demanded impossible agricultural 
quotas and resulted in massive deforestation. Mao’s rhetoric indicated disdain for the natural 
world as a limit to human freedom. In an essay criticizing Stalin, Mao declared that “‘Man’s 
ability to know and change Nature is unlimited.’”21  
  Mao’s antagonistic attitude toward non-human nature, which contained real roots in 
Marxian materialism, is best demonstrated by the innumerable dams constructed during this 
period. Between 1949 and 1990 80,000 dams were constructed in China, while by 1980 almost 
3,000 of them had collapsed, causing significant loss of life and environmental catastrophe. 
Again, the Three Gorges Dam exemplifies the Chinese trend toward state-led modernization and 
manipulation of the environment on a massive scale. While the monumental Three Gorges Dam 
did not break ground until the 1990s, Mao was obsessed with the project, and even composed 
poetry in honor of it imminent construction: 
Winds flap the sail 
tortoise and snake are silent, 
a great plan looms. 
A great bridge will fly over this moat dug by heaven 
and be a road from north to south. 
We will make a stone wall against the upper river 
to the west 
and hold back steamy clouds and rain of Wu peaks. 
Over tall chasms will be a calm lake, 
and if the goddess of these mountains is not dead, 
                                                 
21 Shapiro, Mao’s War Against Nature, 68. 
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she will marvel at a world so changed. 22 
 
Finally, Mao’s policies incited the massive population boom that precipitated the One-
Child Policy. Population nearly doubled during the Maoist period in China, rising from around 
500 million to nearly one billion persons. In response to a paper by influential U.S. Secretary of 
State Dean Acheson, Mao pilloried the “Western bourgeois economist” Thomas Malthus and 
claimed that “it is a very good thing that China has a big population. Even if China’s population 
multiplies many times, she is fully capable of finding a solution; the solution is production.”23 
These and other policies coalesced into a radically antipathetic attitude toward nature, with 
disastrous results. In many respects, though, the formative years under Mao were merely a 
forerunner to the massive development and destruction of contemporary modernity.  
 In the years following Mao Zedong’s death in 1976, China’s political economy shifted 
toward “socialism with Chinese characteristics,” or state capitalism. The Reform and Opening 
Up period witnessed a succession of heads of state (Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao, and 
now Xi Jinping) dedicated to privatization of the Chinese economy while simultaneously 
maintaining authoritarian Party structures. The early Reform period, especially, emphasized 
increased material wealth over and above the socialist tendency toward equality of living 
standards and consistent income guaranteed by the state. “The alternative to equality was said to 
be xiaokang (well-off society), a state in which individuals sought their own pecuniary 
benefit.”24 Private entrepreneurial effort, accompanied by an enormous influx of foreign direct 
                                                 
22 Yin, The long quest for greatness: China’s decision to launch the Three Gorge’s Project, 345.  
23 Economy, The River Runs Black, 45. 
24 Tilt, The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China, 62. 
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investment, initiated rapid industrialization of both cities and countryside. This vision of 
modernity was the subject of an intense discourse and debate within political economy. The 
benefits of capitalist modernization accrued in an uneven and inegalitarian manner, while also 
shifting millions from poverty and creating an urban consumption class.25 For our purposes, 
however, the impacts of the Reform period are relatively clear. The complex of industrial 
infrastructure powered by fossil fuels and dependent upon a marginalized migrant population 
provoked a series of environmental challenges and catastrophes.  
Capitalist Modernity: 
Effects and Rhetorical Mitigation 
 Estimates vary, but the cost of environmental damage and resource exploitation to the 
Chinese economy is roughly 8-12% of annual GDP, effectively offsetting the average rate of 
growth in contemporary China.26 Additionally, according to estimates by a UNICEF official, 
China will undergo “a 25 percent loss of arable land, a 40 percent increase in water needs, a 230-
290 percent increase in wastewater, a 40 percent increase in particulate emissions, and a 150% 
increase in sulfur dioxide emissions by 2020.”27 While these statistics may be difficult to 
conceptualize, the effects of industrialization are already apparent in the dire public health 
situation. The vast majority of Chinese citizens are threatened with severe deficiencies in air and 
water. Linkages between particulate matter from factories and human health lead to an annual 
death toll of around 300,000 people from air pollution.28 According to the World Health 
Organization, seven of the world’s ten most polluted cities are located in China. A 2007 World 
                                                 
25 Harvey, David. A Brief History of Neoliberalism. Oxford University Press, 2005. 
26 Economy, The River Runs Black, 91. 
27 Economy, The River Runs Black, 93. 
28 Tilt, The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China, 71. 
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Bank report estimated the economic damage of air and water pollution at $100 billion annually. 
Almost all of China’s 50,000 kilometers of rivers are too polluted to use for drinking water or 
irrigation, and 80% of them no longer support fish.29 China’s officials speak of combating the 
“three emissions (san fei): air pollution, water pollution, and solid waste.”30 Different authors 
identify variable causes for the lack of state mitigation, but the literature is unified in its finding 
of a relatively anemic official response.  
 The previously considered case of the Three Gorges Dam, however, reflects a high level 
of state involvement. Neither Sun nor Mao succeeded in their goal to construct the hydroelectric 
dam, which was always conceived of as part of a wider modernization campaign. Deng 
Xiaoping, who initiated Reform and Opening Up in the years following Mao’s death, attached 
his influence to the project early on. Once Deng decided in favor of the project, there was little 
possibility of a reversal in policy. “‘I approve of the dam design. Be determined once decided! 
Don’t vacillate.’”31  
 In 1989 the nuclear scientist and journalist Dai Qing published Yangtze! Yangtze!, 
which included a series of interviews with relevant actors. In part because of that book, Dai is 
now considered the most public dissident and intellectual against the Three Gorges Dam. In her 
interview with Li Rui, the retired engineer decried the 175 meter dam that would require 1.3 
million to relocate, reminded readers of possible reconstruction costs due to sedimentation, and 
proposed several smaller dams and dikes instead. “Of course, dikes are not as grand as dams are 
                                                 
29 Day, Kristen A., ed. China’s Environment and the Challenge of Sustainable Development.  Armonk, New 
York: M.E. Sharp, 2005. 1-270. 6-7. 
30 Tilt, The Struggle for Sustainability in Rural China, 112. 
31 Yin, The long quest for greatness: China’s decision to launch the Three Gorges Project, 400. 
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and, hence, do not constitute a glorious testimonial to the builders.”32 In a similar fashion, Dai 
Qing lamented the grandiosity of China’s leaders and called upon so-called “red specialists” to 
reconsider their faith in technology.33  
Dai hardly constitutes a challenge to the Communist Party from the “New Left.” Instead, 
much of her rhetoric relates to the strength of the state, which she argues would be undermined 
by the Three Gorges Project. The nuclear scientist views the project as a relic from the days of 
Mao-era collectivism, and decries in particular the relocation of hundreds of thousands of 
residents from the river valley. She put it succinctly: “The project is encouraging corrupt 
economic practices in enterprises and in the government and will lead to an enormous waste of 
resources, all while destroying the environment and violating the rights of the people.”34 The 
Chinese state official responsible for resettlement, in a fascinating rhetorical device, employed 
the term “developmental resettlement” in his book on the subject. Clearly, the party hoped to 
preserve the modernist associations of the Three Gorges, despite the clear dark side to the 
“development.” Ultimately, however, Hu Jintao oversaw the completion of the Three Gorges 
Dam, inaugurating a new age of megadams and other large industrial infrastructural projects. 
China faces its most serious challenge in global climate change, a phenomenon that 
threatens the sustainability of capitalist development, in addition to human existence on the 
planet. Two material facts attract particular attention. China will surpass U.S. GDP by 2020, and 
in 2005 earned the dubious honor of top emitter of greenhouse gases that contribute to global 
climate change. The Three Gorges Project was designed, in part, to reduce the carbon intensity of 
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China’s economy. Moreover, neither of these data is per capita, and the projected peak 
population of 1.6 billion in 2040 necessitates considerable study.35   
Many Western politicians blame Chinese intransigence for the absence of an international 
political agreement on mitigation and adaptation, yet ignore the historical responsibility of 
already industrialized Western countries for climate change. China itself has rightly argued that 
the attempt to mitigate climate change should rest on “common but differentiated 
responsibilities.” Instead of engaging in an historically ignorant and quasi-imperialist 
condemnation of China, Western academics should heed the norms of environmental justice and 
assist China in “leapfrogging” past fossil fuels that traditionally powered industrial capitalist 
development. Given the above existential crises, China is a nation grasping toward an alternative 
notion of modernity, although it is unclear what specific destination will be reached.  
One surface indication of China’s attitude toward modernity is the state’s rhetorical 
response to the aforementioned crises of human-environmental interaction. While state 
intervention into pollution and climate change has thus far been weak, state discourse deals 
directly with myriad environmental challenges. In 1992 China joined the UN Conference on the 
Environment and Development, and signed its own version of the Agenda 21 action plan. The 27 
principles outlined in the so-called Rio Declaration essentially inscribe the right of future 
generations to live comfortably, a conceptualization of sustainability articulated in the 
Brundtland Report of 1987. In doing so, the state recognized the interrelationship between the 
environment and development. Deng Nan, a state official and the daughter of Reform-era leader 
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Deng Xiaoping, noted that “if environmental problems are ignored in the process of 
development, economic development will be severely hampered.’”36   
Through these actions China appeared to indicate support for the concept of sustainable 
development, which calls for the incorporation of environmental concerns into growth plans, as a 
safeguard for future generations. As such, the 17th National Party Congress included the quite 
similar concept of “scientific development” in its platform in October 2007.37 This dramatic 
rhetorical shift results from President Hu Jintao’s notion of the “harmonious society,” and is an 
attempt to mitigate rising social division and protest, much of which results from environmental 
degradation. Moreover, some state officials within the environmental ministry even supported a 
reduction in growth rates in order to protect the environment.38 All of these factors combined 
reveal a sense of discursive change within the highest echelons of the Chinese Communist Party. 
Whether these rhetorical adjustments will translate into substantive practical policy measures is 
yet to be seen, but there are some available on-going case studies. 
Shanghai-Dongtan:  
Regional, National, International 
As with many projects billed as “environmentally sustainable,” the eco-city of Dongtan 
operates on multiple scalar levels. In order to understand fully the range of political and logistical 
implications of the city, it is necessary to consider the spatial dimensions involved. On the local 
level, Dongtan sits on the eastern flank of Chongming, an alluvial island along the Yangtze River 
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Delta to the northeast of Shanghai.i The island, which falls beneath the same county 
administration as Shanghai, more than doubled in size since 1950 as a result of deforestation and 
soil erosion along the banks of the Yangtze.   
Over 700,000 people live on Chongming, which consists mainly of agricultural land and 
pristine wetlands. Currently the few permanent residents of Dongtan cultivate an estimated 
10,000 acres of farmland, but the terrain is dominated by marshy wetlands. The Dongtan 
Wetland displays some of the richest biodiversity on the planet, and remains one of China’s 
largest bird reserves. In fact, nearly 100 separate species of bird pass through Dongtan as part of 
their annual migration patterns. National and international wildlife conservationists deem several 
of these species rare and endangered, including the black-faced spoonbills, with only a few 
thousand mature birds surviving.39  
The Shanghai Industrial Investment Corporation (SIIC) acts as the main regional actor in 
the Dongtan project. In 1998 the Communist Party Chief of Shanghai and member of the 
Politburo, Chen Liangyu, steered the island of Chongming into the possession of SIIC. A 
municipal state-owned enterprise (SOE), SIIC is a property company with offices in Hong Kong 
and projects on the global stage.40  The Shanghai municipal government also planned to 
construct the Hu Chong-Su tunnel bridge from Shanghai to Dongtan, thus decreasing travel time 
from the city core to around one hour.41 Shanghai likely directed SIIC to acquire Dongtan to 
undertake orthodox land development and city expansion. Throughout the 1990s Shanghai 
experienced a massive influx of new urban residents, which caused housing shortages and a 
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severe pollution problem.42 Chen Liangyu, the Party Chief, was the original driving force behind 
the operation, suggesting that some element of local participation is required for plans to even 
begin.  
Given that the area of Chongming Island under review is relatively uninhabited and 
composed of pristine wetlands, the Chinese government in Beijing reportedly required a focus on 
sustainability. According to Peter Head, an employee of the Arup engineering firm, “‘Shanghai 
wanted to develop Chongming Island. The Beijing government was concerned about this as it 
presented a threat to the wetland and ecology of the island.’”43 If true, this detail adds an 
important national component into the discussion surrounding stakeholders in Dongtan. Recent 
rhetorical and substantive shifts by China’s so-called “Fourth Generation” of state leaders and 
bureaucrats may indeed uphold the veracity of the central government’s ecological intentions. As 
aforementioned, then-President Hu Jintao produced the new terms “harmonious society” and 
“scientific development” with keen interest in addressing environmental threats.  In any case the 
Dongtan project stands as an example of an urban sustainability project with national support.   
Finally, Dongtan received critical international support, including, crucially, the 
participation of British “design, engineering, and consultancy” firm Arup. SIIC named the 
American Monitor Group, a global consulting firm, and the British Sustainable Development 
Capital LLP, an investment banking firm, as early allies in the process. They also indicated 
support from several transnational construction and research companies, including McKinsey & 
Company44. Prominent British politicians praised the international partnership between Western 
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companies and the Chinese government as a new model in urban development. In former Mayor 
of London Ken Livingston pronounced the idea “breathtaking in scale and ambition,”45 while 
former Prime Minister Tony Blair joined former Chinese President Hu Jintao in a ceremony 
celebrating signed contracts for Dongtan and future projects concerned with sustainable 
development. In 2008 former Prime Minister Gordon Brown also lauded the efforts of Arup and 
SIIC, and advocated similar projects in the United Kingdom.  
In 2006 SIIC and Arup published a promotional book entitled Shanghai-Dongtan: An 
Eco-City outlining the contours of the plan to build the Dongtan eco-city.46 While it credits 
Chinese editors for compiling the material, much of it background information on Chongming 
Island and Shanghai-Dongtan, the over-200 page book also details Arup’s “green master plan” to 
develop the eco-city. Moreover, the opening segment of the book features Western luminaries in 
the field of sustainable urbanism and the inspiring rhetoric of several Arup employees. The 
publication of Shanghai-Dongtan serves as a neat encapsulation of the intentions of the regional, 
national, and especially international actors involved.  
Arup’s context and goals, in particular, shine through the various English-language 
essays of Shanghai-Dongtan. Arup selected Sir Peter Hall, an influential urban historian and 
polymath with deep concern for sustainable cities, to set the agenda for the publication. Sir Hall 
is also closely associated with emerging interest in urban regionalism, a focus that animated 
Deng Xiaoping’s decision to create special economic zones (SEZs) in southern China. Here the 
well-reputed historian adopts a rather large frame of analysis. He specifically references 
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Curitaba, Brazil and Bogotá, Colombia as role models in sustainable development, limited only 
in that they constitute already-existing cities. That fact does not necessarily reflect poorly on the 
Latin American states’ record, Hall reminds us, given his trenchant critique of what he termed 
“the importation of universal sprawl from Los Angeles.”47 Simply put, Sir Hall advises the 
multinational planners to create a city “totally penetrated by green space inside” with a high 
density population supported by varied forms of mass transit, including buses and light rail. The 
short essay reflects upon the historical precedents for the sustainable integration of urban and 
rural regions, mainly in Europe, and advances a few core principles of urban efficiency without 
addressing the local circumstances within Shanghai-Dongtan. Ultimately, Sir Peter Hall seems to 
warn SIIC and Arup that a project of Shanghai-Dongtan’s considerable scale requires the 
systematic extraction of lessons before “design for real” can begin.48   
The internationally recognized sustainability expert Herbert Giradet, by way of contrast, 
clearly articulates what he takes to be the purpose of the eco-city project: to “demonstrate that it 
is possible to create a form of urban development that is environmentally sustainable while also 
offering a solid economic basis for its inhabitants.”49 Girardet’s comments closely align with the 
concept of the “Triple Bottom Line” of people, planet, and profits. The primary force behind the 
Huangbaiyu eco-village, William McDonough, accorded with the “Triple Bottom Line” 
definition of sustainability, as reviewed below. Girardet also referenced Ebenezer Howard’s 
Garden Cities design that was partially implemented in late 19th century Britain as a response to 
the environmental damage and social alienation inherent to rapid urbanization.  
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Lastly, Shanghai-Dongtan included an essay by Gary Lawrence, a sustainability pioneer 
who developed Seattle’s ambitious municipal plan and is the director of the US Smart Growth 
Leadership Council. Lawrence expresses the optimism of “smart growth” policies to mitigate 
environmental catastrophe, from the urban-regional to the international scale. According to 
Lawrence, “SIIC and Arup see sustainability as a framework for problem definition, analysis and 
decision-making that can serve self-interest and the public’s interests together.”50 Under this 
rubric, public-private partnerships reflect the complementary nature of sustainable development. 
The logical outcome of the “Triple Bottom Line” and “smart growth” philosophies is a 
recalibrated societal equilibrium that addresses ecology while preserving the profit motive.  
Finally, Terry Hill, the Chairman of Arup, offers a brief foreword to the British 
company’s master plan. Hill’s introductory remarks outpace even Girardet in their ambition: 
“Dongtan will define the future of sustainable urban development for the world and provide a 
blueprint for the planning of further sustainable communities in China and beyond.”51 At first the 
confident use of future tense (i.e. “Dongtan will…”) suggests an unsubtle hyperbole in Hill’s 
declaration. On the other hand, the full array of international interests involved in the Shanghai-
Dongtan project speaks to the immense importance of ecologically-orientated urban design. 
Urban planners, policy makers, and the public are united in that they lack a coherent example of 
a city designed entirely for sustainability, even one allowing for a modest profit.   Shanghai-
Dongtan would serve as an exemplar to the world of global ecological civilization, with the city-
region selected as the fundamental unit of sustainability.  
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As mentioned above, the city holds predominant importance as the site of any remotely 
sustainable society.  The uniform optimism and praise for the project in Shanghai-Dongtan, the 
Arup-SIIC promotional book, captures the sense of the singular importance of the project. 
Respected figures like Peter Hall and Herbert Girardet likely agreed to promote Shanghai-
Dongtan because of the enormous promise of urban regionalism in China. While Howard’s 
Garden Cities never systematically challenged British industrialism, the planners of Shanghai-
Dongtan explicitly rejected the city’s parasitism over the surrounding region for food resources 
and waste deposits. Moreover, the selection of the Shanghai-Dongtan city region encapsulates 
the best elements of urban regionalism, and retains the added advantage of political pragmatism. 
Kent Portney, another sustainability scholar, writes persuasively: 
in terms of sustainability, ecosystems or species habitats are the appropriate levels at 
 which the environment should be viewed, but in practice there is little correspondence 
 between the geographic area of an ecosystem and the boundaries of governmental 
 jurisdictions…If the focus on cities as sustainable units represents a concession to 
 political realities, is it, in fact, possible to develop the political will to address issues of 
 sustainability in cities, even if it cannot be done at the state or national level? To the 
 degree this is achievable, cities undoubtedly constitute important governmental 
 jurisdictions.52 
 
Later in this essay I will consider Shanghai-Dongtan’s unfulfilled potential as a 
“development project” that recognized the fundamental tension between the urban and rural 
within capitalist economic frameworks. Indeed, the editors of Arup’s promotional materials 
seemed quite conscious of their project’s novelty and rejection of “business as usual.” They note 
that “up until now, there is neither a mature theory of eco-cities to follow, nor any existing 
examples in the real world to draw upon” and that “without a clearly defined method of 
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sustainable economic and urban development, the utopia of environmental idealism can only 
follow from splendor to oblivion.”53  
The “Master Green Plan” in Theory and in Practice 
 The splendor of environmental utopianism is on full display in the pages that follow. 
Arup’s plan was to transform eastern Chongming Island into a model of urban sustainability, 
while preserving the other two-thirds of the island for open wetlands and agriculture. Within the 
new eco-city, Arup planners imagined three smaller towns would arise organically. The Marina 
Village, with its ferry and open waterfront, should emphasize study and play; Lake Village, 
another center for international tourism, should focus on play and lifestyle; lastly, Pond Village 
should contain residential units and include elements of lifestyle and work. The aesthetic quality 
throughout the three imagined villages arose out of constant contact with “nature and wildlife,” a 
sense of “surprise” and “place,” and landscape designed to facilitate appreciation of four discrete 
seasons.54  
 However bucolic, Arup’s master plan presented a very detailed schematic of the contours 
of the eco-city: in energy production, public transit, waste removal, and the residents themselves. 
First, Shanghai-Dongtan called for a high density city to support the viability of public transit, 
the ease of pedestrian transport, and the general aim of energy efficiency. The city’s total density 
would be 100 persons per hectare, while the net residential density would be 220 persons per 
hectare. Interestingly, these figures are dwarfed in comparison with the residential densities of 
immense cities like Hong Kong and Shanghai proper. Still, the editors noted that there are no 
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clear environmental benefits, and certain psychological setbacks, of urban concentrations above 
120 persons per hectare. Finally, homes and other buildings would be designed to more 
efficiently consume energy inputs, ultimately reducing energy use by 70%. Many buildings 
would be covered with vegetation or “green roofs.”55  
Second, public transit would provide the vast majority of transportation. Arup planners 
envisioned hydrogen fuel-cell buses as the future of mass transit, in conjunction with the Hu 
Chong-Su train from Shanghai to Chongming. By this combination of light rail and buses, the 
alienating impacts of contemporary cities would be drastically reduced. Indeed, residents would 
only need to walk seven minutes maximum (from any single part of the city) to reach a public 
transport route. The master plan allotted significant space to pedestrians and cyclists, as the “low 
carbon future” spread to the level of lifestyles of community members.  Shanghai-Dongtan 
framed these transportation networks as possessing an added benefit – friendlier and more 
physically fit residents. 
The challenge of energy production likely looms larger than regulation of residents’ 
caloric intake, given the requirement of a carbon-neutral eco-city. Other promotional materials 
listed diverse energy sources including a rice husk biomass power plant, a wind farm, biogas 
from solid waste and sewage, and solar power.  All of the energy generated by wind turbines 
would be directed to the “energy supply centre” in the New Energy Park. The New Energy Park 
would serve several functions. As a public park in the center of the eco-city, residents and 
tourists would flock to its large water park and outdoor playground. Again, the image is equally 
cosmopolitan as it is pastoralii:  
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From the international leisure centre, people can take boat journeys along the 
canals which are fringed with aromatic plants where bird sing [sic] all the way to 
New Energy Park…The water park and outdoor playground feature a large funfair 
with many attractions such as a labyrinth, picnic sites, hot air balloons, kite-
flying, horse riding, boating, water skiing, speed-boat racing, sailing, canoeing, 
water theatre and much more.56 
Additionally, the New Energy Park would retain a didactic quality. An energy exhibition center 
would educate visitors on the proliferation of renewable energy technology, and the dialectic 
between energy and humanity.  
As a final design principle for the eco-city, all waste would remain within the bounds of 
the city. Herbert Giradet elucidated the reasoning for a highly intensive regime of waste 
management. “To become sustainable, cities have to mimic nature’s circular metabollism, using 
and re-using resources efficiently and eliminating waste discharges not compatible with natural 
systems.”57 Ninety percent of all waste was to be recovered for use in the biogas plant and 
composting. William McDonough’s philosophy of design, again, incorporates strong rhetoric in 
support of mimicking natural metabolisms. McDonough’s formula that “waste = food” will be 
considered in the section on Huangbaiyu. 
These and other visions led The Economist to describe Shanghai-Dongtan as an 
“ecotopia.” Because of SIIC-Arup cooperation, Shanghai-Dongtan is more appropriately 
considered “a “green” master plan…another showcase urban sustainability project…a new 
opportunity for unparalleled ecological achievement or monumental failure.”58 In fact, Arup’s 
“green master plan” may have been too specific. By this I mean to say, quite emphatically, that 
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the top-down micromanagement of Shanghai-Dongtan allowed for nearly no public involvement. 
A structural and scalar analysis of the planned eco-city should not exclude the residents of 
Chongming Island and Shanghai proper. Indeed, Giradet explained the preeminence of local 
knowledge while arguing that truly sustainable development depends on cultural change: 
The greatest energy of cities should flow inwards, to create masterpieces of 
human creativity, not outward, to draw in ever more products from ever more 
distant places. The future of cities crucially depends on utilising the rich 
knowledge of their people, and that includes environmental knowledge. Cities 
ultimately reflect their inhabitants. If we decide to create sustainable cities, we 
need to create a cultural context for this to happen. In the end, only a profound 
change of attitudes, a spiritual and ethical change, can bring the deeper 
transformations required.59 
  
 SIIC and its partner Arup could hardly have overlooked the above citation from Giradet, 
since it appeared in their own publication as marketing material compiled to draw support for the 
project. Yet there is no evidence that any of the villagers were consulted or involved in design. 
Local participation is not only important because of the invaluable knowledge of long-term 
residents of the land, but also because of the human right to a political voice in one’s personal 
destiny. If interested in sustainability, human societies must radically redefine their political and 
economic as well as cultural infrastructure. Cultural and ethical change will only be meaningful 
if the population can act on their preferences. As Amartya Sen stated in Development as 
Freedom, “freedoms are not only the primary ends of development, they are also among its 
principle means.”60 Here Sen encapsulates the elementary principles of democracy and self-
determination. Without meaningful public participation (if not complete control), well-
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intentioned sustainable development projects like Shanghai-Dongtan will fail to create models of 
what society desperately requires. That is, a future without irreversible environmental 
catastrophe. 
The lack of local participation was compounded by intrigue within the systematically 
corrupt Chinese government. In 2006 Chen Liangyu, the driving force behind the project in 
Shanghai, confronted charges of misappropriating pension funds and was swiftly sacked by the 
central government.61 Without Shanghai’s central figure, confusion ensued as to which actor 
would provide the majority of capital to actually construct Shanghai-Dongtan. At one point SIIC 
accused Arup of being more interested in its own “economic sustainability,” meaning short-term 
profit, than environmental sustainability.62 Additionally, the sheer complexity of actors involved 
may have led to some unknown conflict that prevented further collaboration.  
As of 2013, Shanghai-Dongtan has not been built. The “master plan” aimed at 25,000 
residents of the city by 2010, in time for the World Expo, a population of 80,000 by 2020, and 
substantial size of 500,000 by 2050. Yet the proposed eco-city lies fallow, and the mostly 
unspoken consensus is that it might never be built. The complexity of interests and interactions 
evinces the transnational nature of environmental protection and attempts toward sustainability, 
but it also reflects an unfortunate democratic deficit in sustainable development. With local 
participation lacking, and the absence of any significant regional support, the project fell 
through. The tension between national and international forces and the lack of local participation 
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stand out as particularly irrevocable obstacles for Shanghai-Dongtan.63 Ultimately the divergent 
priorities of Arup, SIIC (and Shanghai), and local residents likely doomed this technocratic yet 
idealistic project.  
Shanghai-Dongtan deserves further study because of its sensible recognition that city-
regions are the primary site of sustainability. If the city had actually been constructed, it could 
have served as an unprecedented model for governments and citizens interested in sustainable 
cities worldwide, and especially in China and Europe, given the United Kingdom’s early interest. 
If it pursues regionally integrated sustainability efforts, China may be able to contend with the 
enormous environmental challenges detailed above. Without local participation guiding the 
process, however, it remains doubtful that urban sustainability can provide a coherent alternative 
to the imperatives of state capitalism in China and the world. 
Huangbaiyu: 
 Successful Conception, Failure by Design 
Huangbaiyu contrasts with Shanghai-Dongtan in at least two fundamental respects: it is 
an eco-village, and, to some extent, it was actually built. Huangbaiyu was an already existing 
village located half an hour from Benxi City in Liaoning Province in northern China.iii In 2005 
the China-U.S. Center for Sustainable Development (CUSCSD) inaugurated Huangbaiyu as a 
“Sustainable Development Demonstration Village.”64 CUSCSD is essentially an NGO with 
offices located in both China and the U.S. The organization’s stated goal is to “promote 
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sustainable development principles through a unique network of public-private partnerships.”65 
Interestingly, Deng Nan, one of the daughters of Deng Xiaoping, the former leader of Reform era 
China, is co-chairperson of the China secretariat. Meanwhile, William McDonough, an architect 
and prominent advocate of sustainable development, co-chairs the U.S. side of the organization.  
A group of international firms, including the architectural firm McDonough + Partners, selected 
the village to create a paragon of sustainable development.  
McDonough and others envisioned a village with a population of around 1500 people, 
with nearly all of the waste produced by this community recycled back into the system through a 
biogasifaction plant. All of the houses within the village were to be built using hay and pressed-
earth, and feature solar panels on their roofs. The houses themselves were planned more closely 
together and with wide streets in order to facilitate community interaction.66 The CUSCSD chose 
Huangbaiyu in part because of the presence of Dai Xiaolong, the village community director and 
a local entrepreneur.  
Of the 400 houses planned, only 42 houses have been completed in Huangbaiyu, and 
their final form does not conform precisely to the original plan. Only three of the houses were 
built using hay and pressed-earth; instead, developers used hay and compressed coal dust, hardly 
sustainable. Additionally, only one of the houses features a solar panel, with the rest dependent 
on biogas. Finally, and for no apparent reason, garages were constructed in each of the houses, 
even though none of the villagers could expect to purchase a car.67 The final price of the houses 
was double what any villager could be expected to afford, and did not meet any of the self-
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imposed sustainability requirements of McDonough’s firm.68 Shannon May, who as a graduate 
student studied and lived in Huangbaiyu for over a year, described the price of the houses as 
increasing to $10,000-12,500 each (approximately twelve times the local median income), and 
reported that no water, electricity, or energy systems were installed in the homes that were 
actually built. The promised $25,000 biogasifaction plant was never built, and today most of the 
houses lie empty on land that the villagers previously farmed.69 Even if the plant had been built, 
it may have conflicted with the lifestyle of the villagers. Agricultural waste in the village is 
typically used to maintain cashmere goats, but would have been diverted to provide surplus 
energy for the biogas plant.  
Huangbaiyu:  
Tentative Conclusions 
Several divergent interpretations immediately arise out of the example of Huangbaiyu. 
First, Shannon May notes that the CUSCSD is almost entirely funded by Fortune 500 companies, 
many of which simply used the Center’s contacts with the Chinese government to their benefit. 
May suggests that this fact reveals a certain disingenuousness on the part of the Center, but the 
contradiction may be internal to the ideology of sustainable development. McDonough often 
asserts that commerce, rather than regulation, is the best strategy in combating climate change 
and ensuring environmental sustainability. His book Cradle to Cradle: Remaking the Way We 
Do Things asserts the possibility of resolving the tension between nature and industry. 
McDonough seeks to resolve the so-called “technical and biological antagonism” through 
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development that accounts for all stages of the human lifecycle.70 Indeed, if the waste recycling 
model of Huangbaiyu was built, it could have served as a model for other communities intrigued 
by sustainable waste practices.  
As part of the preparation for EXPO 2000 in Hannover, Germany, McDonough + 
Partners pieced together the “Hannover Principles,” a document that explains the principles of 
sustainable design. The Hannover Principles begins on the basis that the “challenge for humanity 
is to develop human design processes which enable us to remain in the natural context.”71 
McDonough proceeds to develop several practical principles in order to aid that process. 
“Design” is conceptualized not as a hindrance but as an essential agent in sustainable practices. 
This leads to McDonough’s definition of sustainable design as “the conception and realization of 
environmentally sensitive and responsible expression as a part of the evolving matrix of nature.” 
Within this list of principles and William McDonough’s writings in general, it should be noted, 
there is no reference to the social obligations of sustainable design.  
McDonough ideologically identifies with the “Triple Bottom Line” concept of 
development with the three pillars of people, planet, and profit. When McDonough visited 
Huangbaiyu he reportedly said to the villagers: “‘we hope whatever we do will make you 
happy.’”72 Even despite this apparent commitment to socially sustainable development, the 
example of Huangbaiyu demands an alternate interpretation. According to a PBS documentary 
on the village, there was only one meeting between McDonough + Partners and local residents. 
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This meeting included the 31 members of the village committee, whose understanding of the 
plan to develop Huangbaiyu the documentary describes as “incredibly naïve.”73 Shannon May 
claimed that there were no all-village meetings held in Huangbaiyu. In any case, as May reminds 
us, the design did not include any “specific standards set according to the local situation,”74 and 
local participation was not a factor throughout the entire process.  
Alternative Modernity Possible, Still 
In this respect, at least, the case of Huangbaiyu was quite similar with that of Shanghai-
Dongtan, with issues of scale largely ignored and an attempt to “remove or marginalize issues of 
political participation and stakeholders’ negotiations for sustainable urban design from every 
level of the city – from the neighborhood to the metropolis.”75 The planners of Huangbaiyu also 
embraced top-down planning and a consumerist growth model, all of which ultimately resulted 
in “unmitigated failure.”76  
Rather than focus on the undeniable failure of the two projects, it is useful to return to the 
concept of a hegemonic modernity. As New Left intellectual Wang Hui contends, “the upshot is 
that the teleology of modernization that has dominated Chinese thinking for the past century is 
now being challenged.”77 Most of the Chinese critique relates to neoliberal globalization as the 
peculiar shape of late capitalism, but this does not forbid future critical analysis of environmental 
and especially urban sustainability. The recognition that capitalist economic globalization 
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coincides with anti-democratic political processes suggests the possibility of a revival of 
democratic participation in a variety of fields and disciplines, including urban sustainability. In 
order to understand this possible revival, though, it is first necessary to examine the 
unsustainable nature of “modernity.” 
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PART II: 
The Rise and Fall of the “Modern” 
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The identification of modernity with neoliberal capitalism is something of a misnomer. 
Cultural historians point to the early 17th century for the first deployment of the word modern, 
and trace out its different connotations in the centuries since then.78 Yet, for the most part, “the 
modern” signifies the liberal rationalist values first systematized during the European 
Enlightenment period, which roughly lasted from the mid-17th century to the first years of the 
19th. The ideological interpretations of this modernity begin with Max Weber, who “defined 
modernity in terms of the spread of markets, formal law, democracy, bureaucracy, and 
technology.”79 The similarities with neoliberalism are unavoidable, although the connection 
between capitalism and democracy should be questioned.  
Still, contemporary critics point to “the heart of global capitalism – efficiency, 
calculability, predictability, technological advancement and control.”80 As cultural values, the 
above simply cannot be denied as central to our version of modernity. Weber’s general 
categories are themselves contested, though. Thinkers as diverse as Immanuel Kant, Wilhelm 
von Humboldt, William Godwin, and even occasionally Adam Smith expressed pre-capitalist 
and even anti-capitalist sentiments in their political polemics.81  
Yet Weber saw the figures of Enlightenment thought as beholden to a secular faith, 
namely progress. As such, “the triumph of reason culminates not in the establishment of a 
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rational utopia imagined by the Enlightenment philosophers but in the forging of an ‘iron cage’ 
of economic compulsion and bureaucratic control.82 The application of instrumental reason to 
social problems, so exemplified by the positivism of the industrial (capitalist) revolution, here 
takes the form of a dogmatic ideology. The harmless humanism of the majority of Enlightenment 
thinkers is perverted into a rejection of what originally animated them: the moral, the cultural, 
and the solidary instincts present in human nature. Weber’s version of the Enlightenment 
conflicts with these tendencies, which are, of course, aspects of human life necessary to a 
sustainable existence on Earth. 
The relevance of the contemporary debates on modernity lies in the application of 
instrumental reason on material reality through technology. As social critic Andrew Feenberg 
noted, “the social goal of science is ostensibly human liberation through progress over nature.”83 
In this sense the question of sustainability escapes from the morass of modernity as a central 
problem. Although we may specify “science” as the instrumental technologies used for the 
benefit of a certain class, be it aristocratic or capitalist, the clear historical legacy of its 
progressive application is ecological destruction. As Lester Milbrath claimed, “‘the most 
important reality in today’s world is that modern industrial civilization cannot be sustained.’”84  
Capitalist modernity is incapable of accommodating this fact. Previous crises in the 
structure of the world economy were skillfully subsumed by capitalist logic. The best example of 
this process came with the militarized economy of World War II, which, in combination with the 
labor and social movements, led to the development of a welfare state. In this case, though, the 
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crisis threatens the existence of capitalism (putting aside the fate of the species). Although 
capitalist modernity is defined by its impressive dynamism, it cannot abide constraints on its 
economic growth. It must grow, or die. 
In the mid-19th century the British neoclassical economist William Stanley Jevons 
unwittingly articulated a fundamental element of industrial modernity. Britain depended 
enormously on coal power both to fire steam engines and to smelt iron, the other lynchpin of the 
industrial revolution. Jevons was tasked with measuring coal production in order to understand 
whether Britain’s industrial (and therefore imperial) supremacy was threatened by dwindling 
reserves. In The Coal Question the author concluded, over 150 years ago, that the supply of coal 
was likely limited to a few decades. Jevons overlooked the rise of petroleum and other 
hydrocarbons, thus rendering his calculations off by about a century. Yet the political economist 
was one of the first to insist on the transience of finite fossil fuels. Even more significant, he 
stumbled upon a law of capitalist economy: 
 It is wholly a confusion of ideas…to suppose that the economical use of fuel is equivalent 
to a diminished consumption. The very contrary is the truth. As a rule, new modes of 
economy will lead to an increase of consumption…It is the very economy of its use 
which leads to its extensive consumption.85  
 
In other words, any increase in the efficiency of energy production will be offset by an even 
larger increase in demand, driven by the profit motive.  
The Jevons Paradox is nothing less than a law of capitalist production – efficiency lowers 
costs, which causes the capitalist to further expand the scale of his or her operation.  Therefore, 
liberal capitalist modernity’s insistence on efficiency is itself a contradiction. As Marxist 
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sociologist John Bellamy Foster observed, “carbon emissions generally increase with 
modernization and its concomitant “improvements” in technology and gains in efficiency…Marx 
explained that capitalism prevents the truly rational application of new science and technologies 
because they are simply used to expand the operations of capital.”86 Of course, capitalist 
industrialization continued well past Mr. Jevons and his contemporary Marx, with severe damage 
to the environment. Climate change presents a novel challenge to the species precisely because 
there is no way to “externalize” the ecological costs of consumption. This time, the crisis is 
global. 
New Left intellectuals in the United States recognized this relationship between 
industrialization and environmental catastrophe even before the cognizance of climate change. 
During the radical activist culture in the 1960s critical theorist Herbert Marcuse launched a 
critique of technology as not merely damaging to the environment, but to human social relations 
as well.87 In doing so the German philosopher resuscitated Weber’s negative description of the 
Enlightenment as built on domination of man by man. The thrust of this historical critique of 
technological instrumentalism can be summarized through Winston Churchill’s apt phrase “we 
shape our buildings and our buildings shape us.” In some sense our societies become embedded 
within the very technologies we create, as Heidegger’s notion of “giganticism” attests.  
Yet technical structures, despite their enormity, are anything but insurmountable. 
Marcuse’s analysis, by extending the critique of technocracy to an emphasis on technology, 
encounters the danger of sacrificing its force as a social alternative. By logical extension, capital-
t Technology assumes the position of pernicious destroyer, rather than the class relations of 
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capitalism. Perhaps more crucially, and as Habermas has argued, too rigid a critique of 
technology “confuses the selective deployment of reason under capitalist modernization with the 
nature and telos of reason itself.”88  
Despite the apparent conflation of control of technology with technology itself, the 
critical reading of normative assumptions and values within technological frameworks is not 
only useful, but absolutely essential. Our ecological challenges, in order to be successfully 
broached, must be recognized as partly technical. Yet technical modernity carries with it the 
regression of efficiency under climate change and the aforementioned Jevons Paradox. 
Ecological modernists, appropriately named, insist that industrial capitalism can accommodate 
global warming solely through renewable energy technology and other technological fixes. 
These advocates of “green capitalism” conveniently ignore the importance of scale, as well as 
popular involvement in technology.   
“Technological change is promoted in an attempt to argue that social relations (of power 
and property) can remain the same…the way technology is embedded within the social system is 
ignored.”89 Yet modernity is at least implicitly upheld and guaranteed by the participation or 
acquiescence of a great mass of people. If an alternative to the destructive tendencies within 
modernity can be imagined, it must be built with extensive popular support and participation. 
As Feenberg notes, “modernization itself…is a contingent combination of technical and 
cultural dimensions subject to radical variation.”90 In both Shanghai-Dongtan and Huangbaiyu, 
the control of sustainability projects belonged almost exclusively to government officials, 
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company representatives, and architects and urban planners.  Public participation, if not control, 
will be contingent to any future grasping at a sustainable urban (or rural) order. This 
“democratization of technical change” is sometimes criticized as undermining the expertise of 
experts. In actuality, “public intervention may actually enhance technical rationality by bringing 
significant issues to the surface early in opposition to vested interests entrenched in the design 
process,”91 many of which were mentioned above. The power relations within any public or 
private project can be significantly altered by increased public participation and local control, 
regardless of the location of that project.  
Still, a jarring question remains after examining some elements of technical modernity in 
Shanghai-Dongtan and Huangbaiyu. Why China? Why did professional elites with ties to both 
the Chinese and Western governments dedicate so much energy to a project that ultimately 
failed? To answer this crucial question we must interrogate the process of modernization in 
China itself, and the possibility of an alternative modernity.  
Modernity, Alternative 
Historians such as Arif Dirlik rightly mention that, at least in a temporal sense, 
contemporary Chinese society is in itself modern. “Modernity in China, as it is globally, is a 
contested terrain where different experiences of the modern produce not a homogenous 
modernity, but a cultural politics in which the conquest of the modern is the ultimate prize.”92 In 
this sense the modern can be localized beyond Earth, state, and even city-region to every 
individual who aims to participate in or challenge existing reality. Even if industrial capitalism 
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permeated every dim and dusty corner of the globe, each individual would experience that 
modernity differently. Even still, modernity is a sociological concept that speaks to structure, 
especially class relations and the power dynamic within technological systems.  
Joel Jay Kassiola proffers a useful starting point for an alternative modernity: 
“Furthermore, this non-Western, alternative model of sustainable development and just social 
order needs to address our human and planetary existential finitude unlike the way in which the 
ideology of unlimited economic growth is in denial and in conflict with our existential 
finitude.”93 Clearly, an alternative to industrial capitalism must be sustainable environmentally 
and socially. The value of an alternative depends upon its success as an institution, as alternative 
modernity. Kassiola is necessarily vague, however, if only because a coherent alternative to our 
contemporary crises does not yet exist. Nevertheless, the author attempts to reinvigorate 
Confucianism as a cultural context for an alternative to the “grow or die” mentality.  
Kassiola proceeds to selectively examine certain Confucian values, such as collective 
morality over material self-interest, indicating that these values by themselves undermine 
industrialism. 94  Confucian and political philosopher Daniel A. Bell similarly attempts to 
reawaken certain Confucian values, although he emphasizes “humane authority” and often 
appears to support developmentalism.95 If fruitful, this reinvigoration could contribute much to 
the discourse on sustainability, and certainly could have moderated the materialist and 
consumerist impulses of Shanghai-Dongtan and Huangbaiyu.  
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However, this approach should seek to avoid totalizing the Chinese experience from a 
Confucian perspective. In “Human Rights and Asian Values: A Defense of ‘Western’ 
Universalism,” published in an edited volume by Bell, Jack Donnelly describes the so-called 
Singapore model of liberal capitalism with an authoritarian political system.96 Western scholars 
too often represent East Asia (and China) as a monolithic subject possessing either Asian 
authoritarian or Confucian “values.” As Dirlik warns, “for all the talk about Asia and Asian 
values over the last few years, the idea of Asia remains quite problematic, and so do the 
ideological and cultural sources from which Asian values are to be derived.”97 It is unclear how 
much cultural currency Confucianism retains as a conveyer of social values. As such, segments 
of the Chinese New Left rely on the Maoist tradition to emphasize elements of the deteriorating 
social contract, like the safety net of housing and healthcare. Confucian values may well 
reemerge in producing an alternative to industrial capitalism, but decidedly Western intellectuals 
must resist the temptation to cleave the world into a simplistic “clash of civilizations.”98 
If there ever was such a clash between West and East, it happened long ago. In fact, the 
history of Western imperialism in China is common knowledge. One imperial outpost was the 
coastal city of Shanghai, located at the mouth of the Yangtze River on the Yangtze River Delta.  
As a result of a series of invasions by foreign Western powers, but especially the British in the 
Opium Wars, Shanghai was established as a treaty port city in 1842. Treaty port cities were 
coastal trading centers physically occupied, in part, by foreign powers, with secured the 
privileges attendant an international occupation, including extraterritoriality.  
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Extraterritoriality was a system “under which foreigners and their activities in China 
remained answerable only to foreign and not to Chinese law.”99  The International Settlement in 
Shanghai also included Western cultural sites, such as social clubs, race courses, and Christian 
churches. Treaty port cities also tended to inculcate Western economic institutions like private 
banks. Shanghai’s International Settlement served as a Western enclave, and as China’s entrepôt 
into the outer world through trade. The cosmopolitan city of Shanghai carries with it the dark 
legacy of Western imperialism, whose silhouette persists still. 
Shanghai as the Site of the Modern: 
Imperialism in the Past and Present 
“Shanghai has come to serve as the location of choice in the examination of Chinese 
modernity – as it is also for the [Chinese] regime, which has decided on making Shanghai into a 
showcase as the vanguard for the contemporary search for modernity.”100 Here, finally, stands a 
clear connection between the discourse of modernity and the eco-city projects in Shanghai-
Dongtan and Huangbaiyu. Of course, the Shanghai municipal body SIIC spearheaded the 
Dongtan project, which lies on Chongming Island within commuting distance of the 
cosmopolitan metropolis. Planners openly framed the eco-city as a showcase for the World Expo 
that was held in Shanghai in 2010: “Whilst Shanghai will wish to be seen by visitors as a 
dynamic, high-density city striving for world-city status, it also aims to show that sustainability 
and access to nature are very important concerns in modern China.”101 Perhaps this statement 
appears relatively innocuous. As geographers have shown, however, space and place are 
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thoroughly implicated in the modernist project of neoliberalism. The all-important role of 
international capital in the Shanghai-Dongtan project forcibly demonstrates “the economic power 
of an ‘extraterritorial’ elite,” 102  a fundamental feature of modern capitalism. The unknown 
preferences of the residents of Chongming Island are considered irrelevant.  
Moreover, David Harvey elucidates another law of globalized capital – the greater the 
mobility and restlessness of capital, “‘the greater incentive for places to be differentiated in ways 
attractive to capital.’” 103  Shanghai-Dongtan was, indeed, a response to genuine domestic 
concerns about the sustainability of industrial development. But the process of construction, even 
if the project somehow goes forward, remains highly problematic.  Contemporary geographers 
describe economic globalization not as the freedom purportedly promised by modernism, but as 
a growing homogenization of culture. The considerable hype for Shanghai-Dongtan, as 
expressed in official and journalistic documents, employed the fashionable term “sustainable” so 
often not out of deep commitment to ecological principles, but instead to  appear hypermodern 
and to attract foreign capital.  
Harvey also observed the trend of redeveloping waterfronts in major cities, in order to 
attract profits through “place marketing” and tourism.”104 While the thrust of Harvey’s criticism 
was to note the disparity between lavish waterfronts and gutted inner city cores and even central 
business districts, another applicable description emerges – the tendency to “embrace the 
ephemeral, the fashionable, and the new.”105  
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Finally, planners both Chinese and Western originally envisioned Shanghai and Dongtan 
as an integrated system. The promotional book prepared by ARUP spoke to Shanghai-Dongtan’s 
financial sustainability when it mentioned the primary economic function of the eco-city, as an 
“international leisure centre aimed at Shanghai” and a “regional tourism sector targeted at the 
high-end commercial market.” 106 The danger here is that the actual residents of Shanghai-
Dongtan would be ignored in favor of “high-end” visitors. The same promotional material 
referred to the proposed eco-city as the “green lungs” of Shanghai, evoking organic imagery to 
describe the leisure pursuits of wealthy Shanghai residents enjoying parks and wetlands. The 
American landscape architect and social theorist Frederick Law Olmsted referred to his parks 
projects as the “lungs of the city,” which also echoed Ebenezer Howard’s suburban Garden 
Cities.107 Yet if Shanghai-Dongtan is to be truly sustainable, how can it support waves of tourists 
flocking to its city limits, even if they decide to use mass transit?  
Urban planner Peter Sigrist worries that “although Arup is not intent on promoting a 
neoliberal agenda, the environmental sustainability discourse surrounding Shanghai-Dongtan 
may attract a wealthy transnational social class that would displace the island’s current 
inhabitants” and that “Dongtan exemplifies China’s moves toward market-oriented urban 
planning.”108 In several respects Shanghai-Dongtan did not represent the self-determination of its 
own residents, a fact that, in retrospect, legitimizes Sigrist’s fears. Shanghai-Dongtan, as a single 
unit, embodies the conflicted relationship between town and countryside in contemporary China. 
Shanghai municipal planners disregarded Chongming’s status as a pristine wetland, leading one 
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sustainability expert to rate the project “‘hardly a truly sustainable option.’” 109 The tension 
between town and countryside, of course, is not a novel phenomenon in China. While urban 
regionalism seeks to integrate the urban with the rural and reduce the carrying capacities of 
specific communities, for centuries the Chinese context has been predicated on the subjugation 
of the countryside for the benefit of the urban elite. In tracing the development of urban-rural 
relations during the anti-imperialist movements of the early modern period, we can better 
appreciate the fundamental sources of economic tension and the state’s strategic emphasis on one 
or the other community (i.e., Shanghai-Dongtan or Huangbaiyu). 
Chinese intellectuals’ first significant contact with Western liberalism resulted in the 
New Culture Movement of the late 1910s and early 1920s, which was connected to anti-
imperialist protest in the urban centers of Beijing and Shanghai. The movement’s thought was 
marked by general disillusionment with Chinese culture and a creative interaction with Western 
concepts of democracy and science. Importantly, the urban-based intellectuals of the New 
Culture Movement regarded rural areas as bulwarks of feudalism that comprised the “degrading 
aspects of the Chinese tradition.”110 Soon afterward, in the late 1920s and throughout the 1930s, 
the attitude of urban intellectuals to the countryside radically altered. Margherita Zanasi, 
historian of the Republican Period in China, observes a “neo-conservative backlash” in 1930s 
China, as city intellectuals cut off by the worldwide economic depression looked inward to the 
hinterland for national rejuvenation. The instability of the warlord period, in which military 
figures vied violently for centralized control, also catalyzed the reconsideration of rural China.  
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The Chinese Communist Party grew out of the earlier ferment of the New Culture 
Movement, as it was founded in 1922. Yet the Party owes its successful reunification in large 
part to its willingness to address peasants’ concerns of exploitation not just by foreign 
imperialists, but by Chinese landlords. “Marxist historians in China in the 1920s and 1930s wrote 
about the relationship of Shanghai (and other coastal urban areas) to the interior as a colonial 
relationship, similar to the relationship of global metropolitan centres to Shanghai.” 111  So 
Chinese socialists, at least, imagined an imperial relationship between coastal cities in the 
hinterland, mirroring the unequal treaty system of Western colonialism.  
Equilibrium of Town and Country: 
From Shanghai-Dongtan to Huangbaiyu 
One might expect the tension between village and coast to dissipate under the Communist 
regime, as sympathetic leaders resist the powerful instinct to extract surplus through taxes and 
crops. As has been widely studied, optimistic expectations were either misguided or simply 
naïve. Journalist Michelle Loyalka documented the suffering of China’s migrant workers, 200 
million of whom flock each year to major urban cities to find work.112 Even after they are 
ensconced in the city, migrant workers are subject to significant discrimination in housing 
through the hukou system. In 1958 the Chinese Communist Party formulated the hukou policy, 
essentially a household registration system that functions as an internal passport, in order to 
regulate urbanization. Given the recent economic reforms, many peasants judged migration to 
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the cities as in their material self-interest. The Chinese Ministry of Housing and Urban 
Development estimates 300 million more rural Chinese will become urban dwellers by 2025.113  
Under the hukou system, migrant workers are treated as if they were undocumented 
immigrants. Migrants encounter systematic discrimination in housing, medical care and 
education, with the constant danger of being deported home. Of course, this is just one glaring 
example of the social contradictions of the countryside in modern China. As reviewed earlier, 
rural China faces severe environmental catastrophe such as water pollution from factories and 
natural resource depletion.  
In response to these compounded crises, the Party in 2006 renewed its commitment to 
poor peasants while calling for a “new socialist countryside.”114 During the Seventeenth Party 
Congress of that year significant state aid was promised to meet housing and welfare needs of 
China’s peasants, with the stated aim of increasing the income of people living in rural areas. 
Former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao first articulated the idea of the new socialist countryside, 
perhaps hoping to tie his own legacy to incipient alternative modernity, but his words and Party 
policy borrowed heavily from the so-called New Rural Reconstruction movement.  
Wen Tiejun, a prominent agriculture professor associated with the Chinese New Left, 
coined the name New Rural Reconstruction. In doing so he implicitly suggested a link with the 
first Rural Reconstruction movement of the 1920s and 1930s, which promoted agricultural 
cooperatives and peasant self-determination. The modern grassroots movement sought to 
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alleviate what Wen termed the “three disparities” of Chinese modernity: rich vs. poor, city vs. 
countryside, and region vs. region.115 Here again arises imagery of dualistic exploitation and 
inequality in China. Sociologist Giovanni Arrighi contends that there is a pattern of “metropolis-
satellite relationships through which the metropolis appropriates economic surplus from its 
satellites for its own economic development.”116 
Before further examining the “metropolis-satellite relationship,” a caveat must be 
appended to the rhetoric of the new socialist countryside. Granted that the Chinese Communist 
Party possesses a real interest in improving the lives of its impoverished citizens, the impetus 
behind the 2005 Five Year Plan was not altruism, but rather the profit motive. American John 
Zoellick praised the plan because “if the prosperity of rural Chinese improves even marginally, 
they will probably buy more American goods and the US trade deficit with China will 
decrease.”117 Zoellick’s statement speaks primarily to American interest in rising rural incomes, 
as increased domestic demand could provide U.S. industrialism with an immodest revival.  
The new socialist countryside programme is properly interpreted as an attempt to create a 
rural middle class, for two reasons. First, “public incidents” or protests have skyrocketed in the 
countryside since the 1980s, mostly for environmental reasons. The Chinese government 
(probably) rightly believes that an increase in rural welfare will limit the possibility of rebellion. 
Second, a rural population improved purchasing power would lead to a burgeoning domestic 
consumer market for the Chinese, as well, not only the Americans. At the very least, Chinese 
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peasants with some disposable income would constitute a captive market in comparison with 
fickle Americans.  
The Huangbaiyu eco-village demonstrates a strong similarity to this materialist form of 
thinking. Although McDonough + Partners did not arrange for any gainful employment for 
village members, all of the new, supposedly sustainable, houses were centrally located on what 
was once prime farmland. Moreover, the decision to include garages in the new houses for 
peasants with an annual income of about $1,000 is patently absurd. McDonough + Partners and 
Chinese state planners shared the same vision of a rising consumer class in the Chinese 
countryside. The plan for a new socialist countryside might have worked, but with its goal of 
enriching only a segment of the rural population, it was hardly socialist. Even disregarding 
economic ideology (if possible), the decision to transform the rural hinterland into an 
automobile-based society fails to meet the basic prerequisites of sustainability.  
Conclusion: Alternative Modernity Possible, Still 
As is evident by this description of efforts toward sustainability in China, much work 
remains to adequately cope with the extensive environmental damage that already exists. The 
threat of future environmental catastrophe will require much more work. Contemporary projects 
merely beholden to national, international, and corporate interests failed to either design or 
implement effective sustainable strategies. Yet the necessity for sustainable cities remains strong, 
the explanation of why Shanghai-Dongtan and Huangbaiyu failed is important in order to open 
up potential political possibilities for other projects. Contemporary and future efforts will 
determine the shape of political space in the age of environmental contingency and adaptation, a 
version of modernity we are already living in.  
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Despite the failure of these two cities, “the pursuit of the strategy of sustainable city-
regions presents itself as a cultural alternative and a political possibility for breaking through 
these many entwined socioeconomic and political emergencies.”118 In spatial terms, the role of 
national and international stakeholders (e.g. governments, transnational corporations) must be 
checked by the input and involvement of local populations. The cases of Shanghai-Dongtan and 
Huangbaiyu demonstrate an important point about development by way of negative example. 
Namely, sustainability strengthened by popular participation and control could constitute an 
alternative to the “doom loop” of perpetual growth and environmental catastrophe within the 
present world system. In other words, the sustainability of human societies needs democracy.  
I contend, conclusively, that an alternative to industrial capitalism must be socialist, or it 
will be weakly subjective and then cease to exist at all. My personal views on this matter 
coincide with Lin Chun’s careful study on The Transformation of Chinese Socialism. Lin 
explains that “rethinking development in China cannot imply renouncing development as such 
on either ethical or environmental grounds. The grand social need of economic development 
remains very real and justifiable.” 119  Still, a radical reconsideration of the ethical and 
environmental underpinnings of economic development, itself a nebulous category, only 
supplements the search for a (nonstate) socialist alternative. Shanghai-Dongtan and Huangbaiyu 
catalyzed the reconsideration of developmentalism, but the project of an alternate modernity 
remains incomplete. In the near future China will be the site, if any, of ecological civilization. 
The most serious task, looking forward, will be getting from here to there.  
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